

**West Dunbartonshire Council**  
**Report by Strategic Lead - Resources**  
**Audit Committee – 20 March 2019**

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**Subject: Capital Post Project Reviews**

**1. Purpose**

- 1.1** The purpose of this report is to provide Members with an update on the latest capital post project reviews undertaken.

**2. Recommendations**

- 2.2** Members are requested to:

- Note the capital projects that were selected for post project review;
- Note the outcome of the reviews; and
- Note the next list of projects recommended for review.

**3. Background**

- 3.1** Audit Scotland published a report entitled “Major Capital Investment in Councils – Follow Up” in January 2016, the details of which were reported to the Audit and Performance Review Committee on 8 June 2016.
- 3.2** The Audit Scotland report contained a recommendation that Councils should “collect and retain information on all projects including explanations for cost, time and scope changes and lessons learned. Report this information publicly to improve transparency and scrutiny of project delivery and share lessons learned across services and other councils”.
- 3.3** In response to the above recommendation a pilot programme of post project reviews was undertaken, the outcome of which was reported to the Audit and Performance Review Committee on 14 December 2016.
- 3.4** As part of our project management approach, post project reviews are undertaken for all one-off projects of £1m and over and any other projects deemed suitable for post project evaluation by the Strategic Asset Management Group.
- 3.5** Due to the nature and timing of the projects that are being reviewed and reported herein there has been a gap since the last report on this subject in December 2016, as meaningful reviews are only possible once the projects have been completed and embedded (typically for at least 1 year after completion) to allow all outcomes to be meaningfully considered within the review.

## 4. Main Issues

**4.1** A total of 8 projects were selected for inclusion in the latest review programme, details of which are included in the following table:

Project	Original Planned End Date	Actual End Date	Initial Budget	Actual Spend	Variance against Initial Timeline	Variance against Budget
			£	£	Months	£
ICT Modernisation	March 2015	October 2017	4.165	4.165	30	Nil
Dumbarton Care Home	February 2016	April 2017	10.000	13.374	14	3.374
New Clydebank Leisure Centre	March 2016	March 2017	18.000	23.810	12	5.810
Replacement of Equipment at Clydebank Crematorium	February 2016	April 2016	1.500	1.686	2	0.186
Energy Efficiency Street	March 2016	July 2017	5.695	5.694	16	(0.001)
Kilpatrick School New Build	March 2015	November 2016	8.150	10.571	20	2.421
Aitkenbar / St Peter's PS Co-location	October 2014	August 2016	9.311	10.646	22	1.335
Lennox PS and St Ronan's PS	October 2016	March 2017	1.581	1.581	6	0

**4.2** The reviews were based on completion of a post project evaluation form with the completed forms reviewed by the Strategic Asset Management Group.

**4.3** Each project lead was invited to attend the Strategic Asset Management Group to discuss the content of the evaluation form with the aim being to gain a fuller understanding of the project (with identification of generic and/or project specific issues that may have arisen) and details of lessons learned that may benefit future projects.

**4.4** The post project review on Energy Efficient Street Lighting Apparatus was delayed to include the results of the last Citizens panel survey that had included questions on it.

**4.5** The main points highlighted within each project specific post project review are noted below:

#### **4.5.1 ICT Modernisation**

Two business cases (ICT Core Infrastructure & Thin Client) were combined into a single project at the point of securing funding. The budget allocation was £4.165m.

It was noted that there was a significant delay of 2-3 months at the start of the project once a preferred contractor had been identified and the contract signed off (took 6 months rather than the expected 3-4 months). This was mainly due to the complexity of the project.

Using East Dunbartonshire Council as a backup data centre introduced a change during the lifetime of the project (this was approved after the original business cases were approved by Council). The Review Group recognised that the project team had anticipated this and built in flexibility to the project plan which was the implementation of good practice, in terms of cost reduction, improved resilience and sharing services with East Dunbartonshire.

The biggest challenge was the delay caused by subcontractor BT Openreach's delivery of Wide Area Network (WAN) which significantly and detrimentally impacted timescales for delivery of the 4 other workstreams within the project.

It was noted that compensation costs were included in the contracts and these were correctly and successfully pursued (as a benefit in kind to the value of £0.250m) which provided a 12% discount of future savings for services that we would have needed to provide at a later date.

WIFI installations, cabling works and construction, design and management works (CDM) caused a small delay. The ICT team worked on the assumption that they would commission the supplier to deliver the cabling works but it transpired that ICT do not have the required construction skills. The process was changed during the project and for all subsequent cabling works. The management of such works to Council buildings will be specified by ICT but managed by consultancy services.

Several of the components delivered were subcontracted, one of which was the Thin Client deliverable. The relationship with that supplier became challenging and required several escalation meetings and clarifications. It transpired that there was a difference between what the main contractor had agreed to deliver and what they had agreed their sub-contractor would deliver.

During the project PSN security requirements changed and an optional design element needed to be added to the project at a cost of circa £0.050m paid from the allocated ICT Modernisation budget.

Instead of spending £0.289m to roll out thin client through the contractor, an alternative approach was developed which involved employing 6 temporary staff at a cost of £0.089m. This was always an optional element of the project spend therefore a notional saving of £0.200m was achieved.

The project savings were achieved on time, despite the overall project being delayed.

### **Lessons Learned**

- Project managers must allocate time for concluding contracts;
- Additional flexibility must be when dealing with external contractors to deliver on time, especially suppliers of utilities (Water, BT Openreach); and
- We should have made the decision to communicate only through contractors and for them to deal with the Sub contractors, though approaches will depend on specific issues and details on a contract by contract basis.

#### **4.5.2 Dumbarton Care Home**

The aim was to replace the Council's Older People's Care Home and Day Services estate in order to meet Care Inspectorate defined standards of care environments, to provide service users, their relatives and staff with a modern living and working environment which enables the efficient and effective delivery of services facilitated by a more cost effective estate.

The original budget for the Dumbarton Care Home was set at £10m, with a revised budget of £13.374m due to various challenges including design changes throughout the development stage, scope creep, increased inflation and time lost due to change of Principal Contractor. The project reached financial close in September 2015. Reaching the project milestone of financial close in the hub West Scotland delivery model and DBDA contract form holds significance in relation to achieving increased certainty with the expected delivery date. The majority of programme slippage was experienced in the development stage pre financial close. At financial close, the construction contract is concluded bringing with it greater structure to the programme with contractual measures at play, delay is experienced. In the development stage, the same contractual measures are not in place and there are fewer levers that can be pulled to bring about programme betterment.

Lack of clarity at the beginning of the project and the absence of a fully developed client brief compounded costs.

During the project there was a change of Principal Contractor from Balfour Beatty to Morgan Sindall who engaged to deliver the project in December 2014. Morgan Sindall carried out due diligence on previous project costings and re-ran their own market testing to establish revised costs in a compressed timeframe. As there was no contingency allowance included within the budget it was advised that whatever came by way of a cost increase had to be offset with a saving. Throughout the project life, the Capital Investment Team (CIT) were engaged with detailed and robust cost analysis to ensure that once firm costs were established at Financial Close, the delivery remained within the revised budget of £13,374m.

Hub West Scotland were supposed to manage the contractor on behalf of the Council as Delivery Partner receiving a Project Development fee for this service, However in reality this was not fully successful therefore a Clerk of Works was appointed on site to monitor quality and progress and prepare weekly reports to the Capital Investment Team.

The end of defect liability period was due by the end of April 2018. Whilst this date has passed, there remain outstanding defects to be resolved and the making good defects certificate will only be issued on completion of these matters. Once certified, this will release the remaining 1.5% balance of retention. Hub West Scotland and Morgan Sindall continue to work with council officers to conclude the few remaining defect items with a view to being in a position to financially conclude the project and agree the Final Account by 31 March 2019.

It was noted that the project board and the CIT should have had the ability to raise concerns and as a consequence the decision was taken to de-couple this process and deliver the Clydebanks Care Home using a different model. Concerns were raised and discussed by the Project Board and at times this was escalated by the Project Sponsor directly with hub West Scotland at Principals meetings. These meetings at times included HSCP Chief Officer and hub West Scotland CEO.

Having completed Dumbarton Care Home, officers have more clarity on the transition process for the Clydebanks Care Home. Officers successfully managed to move a large number of vulnerable people and staff; however in terms of transitioning there were double running costs in terms of staff in moving complex cases.

Staff training went well and was regarded as being innovative, allowed staff an opportunity to attend familiarisation and training, new working models and new service models. It was advised that the new care home is attractive to residents and is forward thinking in terms of providing Wi-Fi for residents.

Annual savings of £0.733m were anticipated within the original business case with full year savings expected from the start of 17/18, however as the business model and design was developed and care inspectorate requirements were agreed following design and layout agreement then the savings were reduced to annual savings anticipated as £0.567m by 2018/19.

The shortfall and delay in the anticipated savings are due to the following reasons:

- The calculated saving was based on a staffing model which did not account for shift patterns.
- There was also a significant re-evaluation of the grading structure of general care staff from Grade 5 to Grade 3.
- Although the 2016/17 budget for staffing and running costs was reduced to reflect the new home opening, the delay in the handover of the care

home resulted in the savings only beginning to be realised in 2017/18 due to double running costs incurred in the lead up to transition to the new home and for a period of some months after transfer of residents as the new model bedded in.

### **Lessons learned**

- It was acknowledged that Health and Social Care Partnership (HSCP) not only opened new facilities, but transitioned from 3 existing care homes into one. However in hindsight, the original costs were based on economies of scale by building 2 care homes together.
- The CIT became involved with the project at the end 2014 by which time Hub West Scotland were already engaged and the Business Case had been prepared in 2012 which established the original budget, programme and target revenue savings. Until CIT became involved, the then CHCP were managing the project themselves without specific technical expertise and support. The CIT should have been involved from the outset.
- The early hub West Scotland costs were generated from applying a benchmarked rate per m2 against a Gross Internal Floor Area. As became more obvious as time went through the development phase, the original capital budget was therefore not realistic and did not meet client aspirations for the facility they were striving to achieve. In addition the client brief was not clear and concise to begin with. It was an iterative process to refine requirements through design development and in turn a value engineering process to ensure proposals were affordable. Costs increased from the development phase prior to reaching financial close. There had been gaps in the design that once identified and incorporated more often than not led to cost increases. This led to the number of beds being reduced from 90 to 84. Robust cost estimates that consider optimism bias in terms of complexity of project, timelines of delivery and standard abnormal considerations should be established.
- The capital project team has put together detail of a number of lessons learned from Dumbarton Care Home which has already informed the tender that has gone out for the Clydebank Care Home. Summary reports have been produced that have been presented to the Project Board which captures data from the development, construction and operational phases in addition to an “issues log” with technical and contractual matters recorded.
- At the time when the decision was taken to build 2 care homes the amount of information on potential sites were not available. Benchmarking exercises for costing was insufficient for actual build as this process makes assumptions on site conditions in terms of construction. In relation to Clydebank the capital budget has been increased as part of the annual Capital Plan refresh and includes budgets for fixtures and fittings and contingency to mitigate risks.

- It was noted time spent on design and development was longer than anticipated. The mechanical and electrical elements created the greatest challenge. It is important to incorporate risk of price fluctuation due to the specialist contractor design elements which are not fully known until post contract award. It was also noted that the complex need of the end user and the need of the service need to be taken into account, and if practical completion date is slipping, we should not transition early just to meet dates.

#### **4.5.3 Clydebank Leisure Centre**

The purpose of this project was to replace the existing Playdrome leisure centre with a new leisure centre in Clydebank. The Council planned to keep the Playdrome operational until the new centre was opened.

Construction work started on site in June 2015 and the centre opened to the public at the end of March 2017.

The original budget of £18m was approved on 6 February 2013 and was increased for several reasons; change of site and the re-alignment of design, with increased scope to include the first floor fit out. In advance of requesting additional capital funding, a significant value engineering exercise was undertaken.

A revised budget was agreed at £23.81m and it was noted that on the basis of the programme and costs established at Financial Close, the project has been delivered within revised budget and revised programme.

The leisure centre, as well as providing a modern leisure facility, is expected to have a positive impact on attracting new business to the area, and particular the development on the Queens Quay site. It has already had a positive impact on West College Scotland. The adjacent plot which is currently being marketed has received interest lately and we understand positive reference was made to the proximity to the Leisure Centre. The Leisure Centre was designed to accommodate additional capacity with a view to the increased local population anticipated from the Queens Quay development – The capacity was “future proofed” to allow for growth and increased footfall. Leisure Centre users now have a reason to visit Queens Quay whereas before it may have been considered a more remote destination that you would have only visited if going to Aurora House, the Titan Crane, Titan Enterprises or West College Scotland. West College Scotland are utilising the facilities on a frequent basis and discussing the potential to re-locate some of their sporting based curriculum and by doing so, this will free up accommodation within the college for other course delivery.

In the first year of operation (2017/18) the Clydebank Leisure Centre has shown improved performance in all areas compared to the last year of operation at the Playdrome (2016/17) with a summary of performance shown below.

	<b>Playdrome</b>	<b>Clydebank Leisure</b>	<b>Change</b>
Income	£416,603	£794,290	£377,687
Usage	£195,882	£329,638	£133,756
Membership	£188	£1,452	£1,264
Fitness Classes	£15,911	£31,737	£15,826

While usage figures for the new leisure centre are higher than those of the Playdrome they are lower than estimated within the 2012 business case as detailed below.

	<b>2012 Business</b>	<b>Clydebank Leisure Centre</b>	<b>Shortfall</b>
Usage	472,143	329,638	142,505

The 10 year capital plan assumed annual savings of £0.250m and the following table provides a comparison with the Playdrome for 2016/17 showing that net revenue savings are lower than forecast in this first year of operation.

	<b>Playdrome</b>	<b>Clydebank Leisure</b>	<b>Change</b>
Gross	£1,392,945	£1,655,592	£262,647
Income	£416,603	£794,290	(£377,687)
Net Expenditure	£976,342	£861,302	(£115,040)

### **Lessons Learned**

For significant capital investment projects a post-implementation meeting should take place to review expected outcomes to actual outcomes and this should happen around 1 year after the end of the capital build phase to allow sufficient time to generate meaningful information.

#### **4.5.4 Replacement of Equipment at Clydebank Crematorium**

In 2014 DEFRA issued a statement requiring local authorities to comply with environmental obligations around mercury abatement. Funding of £1.500m was put in place to deliver the replacement of the 3 existing cremators with 2 new units (one to have the capacity to take extra wide coffins) and install mercury abatement equipment.

In 2014 Hub West were procured to project manage the project and they appointed Ramsay's to carry out a feasibility study. It became apparent that this was a complex project requiring specialist project management and that HUB's insistence on using a standard contract as opposed to the required bespoke contract would put the project delivery in jeopardy. There then followed a twelve month delay whilst trying to agree the form of contract. When a suitable contract could not be agreed the Council severed HUB as main consultant and novated all responsibilities over to Ramsay Project Management a specialist consultant in this field



The main objective was to deliver this project whilst being able to have a working crematorium. This was achieved by not having cremations carried out on Friday's of each week. Maintaining the service whilst managing project works was a significant challenge but one which was met.

Asbestos was discovered when the new lighting system was being installed in the Chapel. This resulted in a 2 week shut down; this would not have been expected to be picked up in survey that was carried out.

Overall the project achieved what it set out to do and in addition the disabled access was improved to ensure compliance. However it was not delivered on time partly due to protracted contract negotiations. Once resolved there was a slight delay of 2 months due to discovery of asbestos and changes to ensure DDA compliance.

The project was delivered over budget, due to the discovery of asbestos, DDA modifications, inflation costs from the original budget allocation (based on a feasibility study in 2012) and additional professional fees incurred by moving from Hub to Ramsay Project Management. However savings were delivered in excess of those initially anticipated. Potential revenue savings for energy efficiency figure was set at 30% (£0.008m per annum) with the installation of the Mercury Abatement equipment and continued participation in CAMEO burden sharing scheme realized revenue saving of £0.058m per annum.

West Dunbartonshire Council has been identified by the Institute of Cemeteries and Crematorium Management as an example of best practice. We have facilitated visits from other local authorities from Scotland and Northern Ireland to see how the project was achieved whilst keeping a working crematorium open

### **Lessons Learned**

- From the outset when commissioning the feasibility study in 2012, it became apparent that this was a complex project requiring specialist project management and planning. Appropriate project management and planning processes should be considered at the outset in future projects.
- Although funding was awarded in 2014, there is a need to agree when a project is likely to start, to build sufficient contingencies and inflation into the spend profile. Appropriate project management and consideration of optimism bias require to be built into cost and phasing modelling.
- DDA compliance issue should have been anticipated. Feasibility study should have picked this up and would do this now through consultancy services.

#### **4.5.5 Kilpatrick School New Build**

The purpose of this project was to replace the existing additional supported

needs school in the Auchentoshan estate which was in a poor condition both internally and externally and also create a new early years centre.

The initial budget requirement of £8.150m was identified in March 2012 when the securitisation business case was prepared, at this time it was anticipated that project design would commence in June 2012 with an expected occupation date of August 2014. Following the rejection of securitisation in 2012 the project was then approved to proceed through the 10 year capital plan on 6th February 2013 and commissioned to be delivered by Hub West Scotland. The main overspend (£1.887m) in the project is due to this change in strategy.

A further overspend was identified after the ground investigation results were received and highlighted additional costs of £0.450m. In addition an area of Japanese knotweed was discovered that required removal.

The second phase of the project was the demolition of old school building and the creation of the sporting grounds. While there remains outstanding information relating to this it is anticipated that a further overspend of £0.084m will be mainly due to the requirement to remove asbestos.

The Kilpatrick school has been completed and opened in November 2016 and is highly regarded in terms of quality.

The business case identified that the project should generate revenue savings of £0.183m per annum, however to date revenue savings have fallen short of those identified in the business case due to optimism bias with a breakdown of actual savings achieved shown below.

	<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>	<b>Saving</b>
Property Costs	£176,249	£80,710	£95,539
Repairs and Maintenance	£39,538	£1,404	£38,134
Cleaning	£47,442	£65,912	£(18,470)
Catering	£104,103	£117,940	£(13,837)
Facilities Management	£41,393	£31,358	£10,035
	<b>£408,725</b>	<b>£297,324</b>	<b>£111,401</b>

It was also noted that there was a long period of time in getting to financial close on this project with implications on the project programme.

### **Lessons learned**

Where the end user of the building is ordering in ICT that is not covered by standard procurement, whole life costs must be considered. This was raised as a generic lesson learned in the ICT post project review workshop as advances in technology can result in changes to the whole life costs of some items from feasibility stage to operational stage (such as music facilities in new build high schools, building maintenance systems, door entry systems etc.). While each build project included these elements they were not considered as a corporate solution, we therefore have several locally

installed solutions rather than centralised corporate solutions.

There was a general issue around optimism bias on this project with unrealistic timelines originally set (resulting in increased costs as a result of construction industry inflation) and anticipated savings being overstated.

#### **4.5.6 Aitkenbar and St Peter's Co-location**

The purpose of the project was to replace 4 sub-standard buildings, (two of which - the two Primary Schools- had significant over capacity), with a new modern, fit for purpose campus while generating revenue savings of £0.190m per annum.

The project was originally anticipated to cost £9.311m in February 2013 and was subsequently increased to £10.4m in February 2014 and £10.646m in February 2015. An overspend of £0.055m was incurred due to Scottish Futures Trust new reference design that all local authorities needed to consider and also due to a specific element of the Bellsmyre Campus whereby the original consultation and design envisaged one entrance and one common area. The new design required two entrances and two common areas. This was a late addition to the design due matters raised by the users of the buildings.

A further overspend of £0.318m was incurred due to the ground investigation identifying contamination in February 2015.

There was a delay in agreeing terms and conditions with Hub West. The project was supposed to be an off the shelf project which was one of the advantages in using the Hub model. However, this assumption was incorrect as this project was more complex than initially envisaged.

It was also noted that internally, we need to bring in ICT at the design stage of new buildings. It was suggested that a solution could be that we hold a ½ day session per month, with a nominated officer group, to discuss issues. This goes beyond this particular project.

While the project delivered its objective it was not delivered within initial budget or on time; however the school was opened on time within the revised programme taking into account the aforementioned issues.

The project was delivered at £0.200m lower than the revised budget; however the revised budget was significantly higher than the original budget.

Revenue saving has fallen short of the target of £0.190m identified in the business case with a breakdown of actual savings achieved shown below:

	<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>	<b>Saving</b>
Water	£13,702	£10,649	£3,053
Utilities	£65,782	£33,106	£32,676
Repairs and Maintenance	£55,805	£3,390	£52,416
Grounds Maintenance	£9,777	£8,707	£1,070
Refuse Collection	£7,187	£5,802	£1,386
Catering	£166,905	£134,314	£32,590
Cleaning	£49,610	£33,741	£15,869
Facilities Management	£77,012	£58,737	£18,275
	<b>£445,780</b>	<b>£288,446</b>	<b>£157,334</b>

### **Lessons Learned**

- There was a lack of consideration of optimism bias in generating the original spend plans for this project.
- For future projects, we need to carefully identify and quantify the advantages of each framework as well as the associated risks.
- Support Service (ICT, FM, etc.) should be involved early in the design stage of any project.
- In planning such projects technical ICT aspects should be standardized.
- The Finance Business Partner should be involved throughout to ensure all financial implications are considered within the costing analysis.

### **4.5.7 Lennox PS and St Ronan's PS**

This project completed in March 2017 with the purpose being to better utilise the school estate within the Bonhill Area of West Dunbartonshire Council. This included the merging of Highdykes and Ladyton Primary Schools. Highdykes and Ladyton (now known as Lennox Primary School) were then relocated into St Ronan's Primary School Building with St Ronan's Primary School being relocated to the former Ladyton Primary School buildings.

The project had a Capital Budget of £1.581m and the project was delivered on budget.

It was noted that the project came in on budget and that the main objectives were met. There was a delay in Phase 2 of the Lennox School project due to an issue with Window installation by the Sub-Contractors. Although no financial impact there was a potential reputational impact as the install required to be carried out during term time.

It was advised that out of the three buildings, two were elevated from Condition C to Condition B and the remaining school demolished and the land put on the market for disposal.

Revenue savings per the report to Education Committee in January 2015 were stated to be £0.404m and current information advises £0.158m have been realised from this project as detailed in the table below:

	<b>Before</b>	<b>After</b>	<b>Saving</b>
<b>St Ronan's Primary</b>			
Property costs	£112,003	£75,351	£36,652
Central repairs	£16,508	£7,344	£9,164
Building cleaning	£36,918	£30,283	£6,635
Catering	£54,771	£49,921	£4,850
Janitorial	£64,997	£29,404	£35,593
	<b>£285,197</b>	<b>£192,303</b>	<b>£92,894</b>
<b>Lennox Primary</b>			
Property costs	£126,684	£85,415	£39,268
Central repairs	£5,101	£3,080	£2,020
Building cleaning	£25,127	£11,277	£13,850
Catering	£78,138	£64,956	£13,185
Janitorial	£106,373	£109,283	£(2,909)
	<b>£339,423</b>	<b>£274,012</b>	<b>£65,412</b>

### **Lessons Learned**

The Finance Business Partner should be involved throughout to ensure all financial implications are considered within the costing analysis.

### **Future Post Project Reviews**

- 4.6** Based on capital projects which are anticipated to be completed by 31 March 2019, the following projects are recommended to be included in the next phase of post project reviews from April 2019:

- OLSP New Build; and
- Energy Efficient Street Lighting Apparatus (delayed as noted above)

### **5. Option Appraisal**

- 5.1** No option appraisal was required for this report.

### **6. People Implications**

- 6.1** There are no personnel issues.

### **7. Financial and Procurement Implications**

- 7.1** Other than the financial position noted above, there are no financial implications or procurement from this report

## **8. Risk Analysis**

**8.1** The main risks associated with not carrying out post-project evaluations regularly or consistently are:

- This limits the Council's ability to identify areas of good practice, share any lessons learned and monitor benefits realised from the investment activity; and
- Future capital plans may understate the investment required.

## **9. Equalities Impact Assessment (EIA)**

**9.1** No equalities impact assessment was required in relation to this report.

## **10. Environmental Sustainability**

**10.1** No assessment of environmental sustainability was required in relation to this report.

## **11. Consultation**

**11.1** The views of Legal Services have been requested on this report and have advised there are neither any issues nor concerns.

## **12. Strategic Assessment**

**12.1** Proper budgetary control and sound financial practice are cornerstones of good governance and support Council and officers to pursue the 5 strategic priorities of the Council's Strategic Plan. This report forms part of the financial governance of the Council

**Stephen West, Strategic Lead - Resources**

**Date: 14 March 2019**

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**Background Papers:** Completed post project review evaluation forms for  
noted projects

**Wards Affected:** No ward directly affected.

